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Showing posts with label Imperial Sugar. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Imperial Sugar. Show all posts

Sunday, September 27, 2009

CSB Recommendations Deficient-Flash Fire Hazards


Shameir Frasier-Imperial Sugar Refinery Burn Survivor

Many stakeholders were anxious to hear the Chemical Safety Board (CSB) key findings and recommendations in the September 24, 2009 release of the final investigation report on the catastrophic dust explosion at Imperial Sugar Refinery. The CSB made five key recommendations with included adherence to NFPA combustible dust standards, comprehensive housekeeping, hazard communication training, emergency response, and that Imperial Sugar implement corrective actions in accordance with best engineering practices referenced in the NFPA standards. These recommendations were not solely directed at Imperial Sugar but the entire industrial sector that handles combustible particulate solids, which generate combustible dust. Yet CSB left out a key recommendation that workers don flame resistant clothing in the protection from flash fire severe burn injuries.

CSB Dust Hazard Study
In 2006 CSB concluded a Dust Hazard Study following a series of catastrophic high consequence dust explosions that occurred in 2003. The important safety recommendations of the study were forwarded to OSHA, which provided the agency a foundation in the formulation of the 2007 and 2008 reissued Combustible Dust National Emphasis Program (NEP). Additionally, following the Imperial Sugar Refinery explosion, the House Education and Labor Committee drafted a combustible dust bill utilizing the CSB Dust Hazard Study recommendations as the framework of the bill. Currently OSHA is drafting a general industry combustible dust regulation, which also is utilizing the CSB Dust Hazard Study recommendations as guidance.

All the recommendations from the Chemical Safety Board prompting action addressing combustible dust hazards in the industrial workplace is great and long overdue yet many layers of protection have been overlooked in the recommendations. This was especially evident when the data from the Dust Hazard Study only recognizes that 281 incidents occurred from 1980-2005, when in reality the incidents are ten times that many. For example, in 2008, the Combustible Dust Policy Institute discovered through media accounts, there were over 150 incidents in the manufacturing, non-manufacturing, and utility sectors. Probability of occurrence is an important element in obtaining an understanding of the complex issue of combustible dust.

For instance, the OSHA Combustible Dust NEP lists several dozen manufacturing national industries (NAICS) that have the potential or have a high risk in experiencing combustible dust incidents. Yet over 50% of national industries that had combustible dust related fires and explosions in 2008 were not listed as target industries (NAICS). Not to be picking on the paper subsector but to use as an example to illustrate a point, it's national industries (NAICS)are absent from the Dust NEP. On a global perspective amongst our international trading partners, an April 2009 dust explosion at a South African paper printing plant resulted in 14 fatalities and dozen of injuries from burns. This incident highlights that paper dust has a high consequence and potential for combustible dust fires and explosions.

Importance of PPE
Understanding probability of occurrence and severity of consequence is only one important aspect in addressing combustible dust hazards in the industrial workplace. Layers of protection are derived from administrative controls and best engineering practices with the final layer, personnel protection equipment (PPE). The Chemical Safety Board overlooked PPE in the recommendations following the key findings of the Imperial Sugar Refinery dust explosion. For instance the April 23, 2008 Chatham Emergency Management Agency, After Action Report mentions that 36 persons were injured and transported to Memorial hospital in Savannah, Ga; 14 of those were non life-threatening injuries. Eventually a total of 20 victims were relocated to the Joseph M. Still Burn Center at Doctors Hospital in Augusta, Georgia with life threatening burn injuries.

Doctors Hospital: Joseph M. Still Burn Center from Doctors Hospital on Vimeo.


Traumatic Burn Injuries
In a Burn Care Commentary time-line of the events following the dust explosion, the Joseph M. Still Burn Center highlights that the victims had," thermal burn injuries ranging from 5% Total Body Surface Area (TBSA) damage, treatable onsite and in area Emergency Departments, to 95% TBSA— critical burn damage that in most cases is not survivable." The Combustible Dust Policy Institute believes that if the workers had worn personnel protection equipment in the donning of flame resistant clothing (FRC), the Total Body Surface Area (TBSA) damage would of been less severe. Without FRC once a fireball makes contact with conventional clothing, the clothing ignites causing even more severe burns than the original flame.

A news account of a worker that succumbed to his burns at the Joseph M. Still Burn Center a week following the dust explosion indicated he had third degree burns on more than 80% of his body. Of the 20 workers that were admitted to the burn center, six (30%) did not survive due to the severity of their burn injuries. Malcolm Frazier, 47, of Savannah, a floor manager at the plant, with burns covering 85 percent of his body was the last one to succumb on August 22, 2008. Malcolm fought a brave fight hanging on for over seven months while his parents Richard and Hattie Frazier vigilantly stood by, encouraging him to persevere.

Burn Injury Studies
Chances of survival after life threatening burn injuries diminish rapidly in accordance with one's age group. In a 1991-1993 study conducted by the American Burn Association, results indicated Total Body Surface Area (TBSA) damage is a key survival factor for burn victims based on the age of the victim. For instance chances in survival of a victim in the 40-49 age group with over 75% TBSA is 30% versus 60% survivability for the 20-29 age group

Lawrence Manker Jr, 20, in the latter group was the last Imperial Sugar burn patient to be released from the burn center in October 2008. Lawrence, like Malcolm had burns to over 85% of his body. To assist the healing process, doctors medically induced him into a coma for six months so they could treat the severe burns. Studies have shown that burns to over 75% of the body can occur easily from the ignition and continued burning of conventional clothing versus workers that don FRC, which do not continue to burn when exposed to a flame source.

Flame Resistant Clothing in Industry
Workers in industries such as the petroleum, petrochemical, and chemical sectors where flash fire hazards also are present, already are donning flame resistant clothing in adherence with the requirements of proper personnel protection equipment. There is a disconnect in the USA where many governmental agencies, legislative officials, trade associations, professional organizations, and numerous other stakeholders are not aware that a dust explosion is a propagating explosion like a vapor cloud explosion which occurred at the BP Texas City Refinery in 2005. Both explosions have the devastating effects of overpressure, thermal radiation, and ensuing projectiles.

Reviewing the OSHA NEP's for combustible dust and Process Hazard Management (PSM), OSHA management recommends that CHSO's (inspectors) wear flame resistant clothing when conducting inspections at facilities where flash fire hazards are present. Ironically after over 55% of the victims from the Imperial Sugar explosion sustained life threatening burn injuries that were admitted to the Joseph M. Still Burn Center, the Chemical Safety Board does not include a sixth recommendation that flame resistant clothing be worn in potentially combustible dust explosive environments.

Conclusion
The only reason I can think that this recommendation was not included was due to the current litigation with millions of dollars at stake in potential compensation of all the burn victim survivors and families of the deceased. CSB must maintain neutrality and maintain impartiality in not placing blame. Including this important yet vital recommendation would of enhanced the plaintiffs case and been a damaging blow to the defendants. In all fairness, Imperial Sugar Refinery employees are now wearing FRC's in addtion to state of the art best engineering practices that CEO John Sheptor has implemented in the reconstruction efforts since the February 7, 2008 explosion.

An OSHA combustible dust standard is long overdue for general industry. In the past six years there's only been a handful of dedicated career governmental employees and legislators directing this much needed occupational health and safety policy. Last Thursday at the Hilton Savannah Desoto on East Liberty Street was a monumental and historical event where the CSB provided much needed recommendations to Imperial Sugar and the entire industry.

These recommendations will validate OSHA's current combustible dust rulemaking process. But that is where the problem arises, especially when all layers of protections are lacking, but must be considered in preventing future fatalities, severe injuries, and devastating economic damage. Personnel protection equipment in FRC's is just as important as housekeeping, training , emergency response, and NFPA best engineering practices. We owe it to Imperial Sugar Refinery explosion victims, survivors and families to get it right in the combustible dust rulemaking process so as to prevent and minimize future catastrophic occurrences.

UPDATE
9/25/09-OSHA combustible dust regulation submitted to OMB for Review. On the fast track now following CSB Imperial Sugar Recommendations http://ow.ly/rkV8 Thanks Larry, for sharing

Saturday, August 2, 2008

Dust Explosions Prior to Senate Hearing

Three days prior to the July 29, 2008 Senate Hearing on workplace Safety, “ Dangerous Dust: Is OSHA Doing Enough to Protect Workers,” ICO Polymers in Asbury, New Jersey witnessed an early morning explosion that severely burned one worker who is in critical condition with burns to his face and arms from the explosion in the plastic pulverizing unit. In the same week four other combustible dust incidents occurred throughout the nation. The cause at ICO Polymers is yet to be determined but all the ingredients are there again for another combustible dust explosion.

Prior Explosions
For instance, one year ago, last July, the same facility experienced a similar event that after an OSHA accident investigation, was deemed a combustible plastic dust explosion in Building One’s Ambient Mill. Where micronized powders of polypropylene, polystyrene, and ethylene were allowed to accumulate, which ignited and exploded, injuring a worker who suffered burns to his hands and back of his head. In this recent incident, New Jersey Fire Officials closed the facility due to the extensive structural damages to the building, which posed an imminent threat.

Recent news reports in the Hunterdon County Democrat, uncovered additional fires at the ICO Polymers facility in 1999 and several explosions in 1997, 1990, and 1989, which also injured workers. In earlier years the plant was owned by Wedco. Change of ownership has not reduced the severity or magnitude of injuries with the events reoccurring in an alarming manner.

Combustible Dust Legislation
A troubling aspect of the recent Senate hearing on combustible dust in conjunction with the recent explosion in New Jersey is that our nation’s legislators and policy makers don’t seem to understand the magnitude of the complex issue concerning combustible dust.

Since the “Worker Protection Against Combustible Dust Explosions and Fires Act of 2008,” was introduced by Congressman George Miller (D-CA) on March 4, 2008 as a result of the February 7, 2008 catastrophic Imperial Sugar Refinery dust explosion in Port Wentworth, Georgia there have been prior hearings held in Congress. Basically, the message has been the same at all the congressional hearings, that there is a problem with the hazards of combustible dust in the nation’s manufacturing sector workplace.

NFPA Combustible Dust Standards
Yet no consensus solutions have been proposed. Instead sole blame has been placed on OSHA which doesn’t have a general industry comprehensive combustible dust standard like the grain facility standard that is already part of OSHA work-place health and safety standards since 1989.

The central aspect of the proposed legislation is incorporating National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) combustible dust standards. This is would be great if OSHA had enough resources to inspect the thousands of manufacturing plants in the nation but it doesn’t. So how will such regulations be enforced unless Congress appropriates additional funding to OSHA? It’s like declaring war yet not sending the troops for lack of funding.

Manufacturing facilities are already required to follow NFPA combustible dust standards through general consensus and nationally recognized standards of care which is recognized by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI). When a violation of combustible dust is found, OSHA inspectors can cite the facility under the General Duty Clause (GDC), Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act.

Local Jurisdiction Enforcement
Local fire and building inspectors that already conduct local inspections need to be utilized more thoroughly in the prevention and mitigation of future combustible dust fires and explosions. These are the professionals that are on the front lines daily and interact daily with local fire departments concerning specific issues that need to be addressed concerning the life safety and structural integrity of commercial buildings.

Fire codes such as the ICC International Fire Code and NFPA Uniform Fire Code already address combustible dust with references to the numerous NFPA combustible dust standards. Following the 2006 Combustible Dust Hazard Investigation, the Chemical Safety Board in addition to recommending an OSHA comprehensive combustible dust standard also outlined that many fire and building inspectors are not knowledgeable concerning combustible dust hazards.

Why hasn’t this aspect of preventing and mitigating future combustible dust incidents been included in congressional testimony? Instead attention has solely been directed at the recent Imperial Sugar incident and placing blame on OSHA as a solution in the policymaking process.

Conclusion
While all the political spin and maneuvering between both political parties concerning labor and business has been taking place over the past five months in regards to pending combustible dust legislation, over 70 combustible dust related fires and explosions have occurred in the nation’s manufacturing sector. The Combustible Dust Policy Institute has discovered through research that approximately 20% of these events are combustible dust explosions and an alarming number are reoccurring like the ICO Polymers accident last week.

A comprehensive combustible dust bill will not solve the problem of combustible dust fires and explosions. It’s only through the cooperation between all stakeholders throughout the national, regional, and local levels that the complex issue of combustible dust can be properly addressed in lessening the severity of future incidents.

Saturday, March 22, 2008

Up Close Imperial Sugar Explosion Update

Six weeks have passed now since the horrific Imperial Sugar Refinery combustible dust explosion that occurred in Port Wentworth, Georgia on the evening of February 7. Imperial Sugar CEO John Sheptor allowed reporters an up close view of the blast site while investigators took a break during the Easter weekend.

Today News Threes Alice Massimi and photojournalist Art Ottimo were able to get a close-up look at the destruction caused by this horrific incident.
Combustible dust explosions and fires are a regular occurrence at numerous manufacturing and processing facilities across the United States and the Imperial Sugar incident is not an isolated case. Already 20 combustible dust related fires and explosion have occurred since the explosion in Port Wentworth.
3/18/08 MUSKEGON COUNTY Muskegon firefighters responded at 1:52 a.m. to the plant at 1867 Huizenga, where they discovered the plant's "dust collector" had caught fire, said Fire Marshall Major Metcalf. It's unclear why the device -- located outside the plant -- malfunctioned

Combustible dust fires originating in dust collectors occur with regularity and without proper voluntary detection, isolation, ventilation, and suppression measures in conjunction with the regulatory good housekeeping requirements additional incidents, will continue.

Just abiding by current combustible dust industry standards and OSHA regulations is not enough as Imperial Sugar CEO John Sheptor suggests, with all good intentions

PORT WENTWORTH, GA (WTOC) 3/21/08 - "We will rebuild this facility to the best knowledge we have with regard to the management of combustible dust, whether that be a regulation or industrial standard and by all means we believe we were operating according to these codes and standards previously," he said.

Rebuilding the sugar plant in compliance to current OSHA combustibles dust regulations will only prolong the situation of the continual occurrence of more combustible dust explosions.Especially since abiding to National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)codes on combustible dust is only voluntary.

At a recent congressional hearing of the House Committee of Education and Labor concerning the introduction of the Combustible Dust Explosion and Fire Prevention Act (H.R. 5522), David Sarvadi a lobbyist and attorney representing United States Chamber of Commerce the world's nationwide largest not-for-profit business federation, of 3,000,000 businesses, didn't believe that a mandatory OSHA combustible dust standard, which includes NFPA combustible dust explosion preventative and mitigative measures was a good idea.

Meanwhile combustible dust explosions are still occuring

3/13/08 By TOM QUIGLEY The Express-Times HIGH BRIDGE,NJ Fire erupted Wednesday inside an enclosed dust collector in a metal-grinding room at the Custom Alloy plant on Washington Avenue, borough Fire Chief Jeffrey Smith said.

The severity of the situation is not just solely on the protection of workers in the workplace from the unknown dangers of seemingly harmless combustible particulate solids and the combustible dusts that are generated. But now our nation's firefighters are at risk when fighting a structure fires where unrecognized combustible dusts are generated and primary and secondary dust explosions can occur during the deflagration event.

And so the saga continues:

3/10/08 WCCO.com OAK PARK HEIGHTS, Minn. (AP) ― Xcel Energy is shutting down its King plant in Oak Park Heights after a fire and possible explosion in a building near the coal-fired plant.
This was the second combustible dust explosion of coal dust within three months at the same facility. Currently, Minnesota is under a voluntary state OSHA program and doesn't even have an emphasis program regarding combustible dusts. So how is it that future preventable and predictable combustible dust explosions and fires can be diminished if there is no nationwide mandatory protective standards?

Resources:

NFPA 654: Standard for the Prevention of Fire and Dust Explosions from the Manufacturing, Processing, and Handling of Combustible Particulate Solids

Google Map Combustible Dust Related Explosions and Fires

 

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