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Showing posts with label House Education and Labor committee. Show all posts
Showing posts with label House Education and Labor committee. Show all posts

Sunday, October 11, 2009

Unions Displeasure with CSB, Tip of the Iceberg

Another salvo was fired at the Chemical Safety Board recommendations, for failure to fully address workplace safety by several unions last week in regards to the INDSPEC Chemical Corporation's release of oleum. Earlier union concerns on the deficient CSB accident recommendations following the deadly explosion at the Slim Jim factory in Garner, North Carolina and T2 catastrophic explosion in Jacksonville, Florida is highlighted when a follow-up on lessons learned does not fully address worker health and safety.

The problem is exacerbated as the union voice only represents approximately 12 percent of the nation's workforce. A recent Bureau of Labor Statistics report on union membership illustrates that out of over 15 million American workers in the manufacturing sector only 1,732,000 are represented by the union. So what about the millions of other non-union workers? Who is representing them when governmental agencies do not fully address workplace health and safety issues?

Mike Wright, United Steel Workers, Health Safety and Environmental Director, was putting it mildly when he stated,"The CSB report process is broken." The problem with CSB's findings and recommendations is much more complex. Especially when only a handful of career governmental employees are directing the nation's occupational health and safety policy through their incomplete recommendations to OSHA.

In all fairness the accident investigations that the CSB conducts in determining root cause has provided essential proactive awareness in protecting the worker. Yet without comprehensive recommendations, injuries and fatalities will needlessly continue to occur when many layers of protection are thoughtlessly overlooked.

Severity of Consequence
The most recent example of CSB's full inattention to the human toil was following the Imperial Sugar refinery dust explosion in which 20 workers sustained life threatening burn injuries and were admitted to the Joseph M. Still Burn Unit in Augusta, Georgia. Six of the workers succumbed to their burns due to the high percentage of total burned surface area.

CSB recommendations included best engineering practices and administrative controls but failed to mention personnel protection equipment (PPE) in the donning of flame resistant clothing (FRC) when working in a environment that posed a potential flash fire or explosive environment, as is the case with combustible sugar dust.

None of the injured workers were wearing FRC's, so the flame front from the dust explosion ignited their clothing, which continued to burn as the flame front passed. The United Steelworkers also raised a concern with CSB concerning the INDSPEC oleum release, where personnel protection equipment was not recommended either.

Probability of Occurrence
Has the Chemical Safety Board forgotten to take into account the entire severity of the consequence in these prior incidents? It's just not the severity of consequence that is at issue but also the probability of occurrence in the risk analysis through lessons-learned. For example, the 2006 CSB Dust Hazard Investigation failed to address the thousands of prior combustible dust related fires and explosions that occurred from 1980-2005.

This resulted in an aberration of fatalities and injuries per incident, occurring in combustible dust related fires and explosions in the manufacturing, non-manufacturing, and utility sectors. The incident data that CSB provided to OSHA, the media, and the public, gave the appearance that fatalities and injuries occur at a high ratio per incident, which is grossly inaccurate.

Incomplete Information
This incomplete picture of the complex combustible dust issue became even more volatile following the catastrophic Imperial Sugar Refinery dust explosion when the House Education and Labor Committee held a hearing on combustible dust fire and explosion hazards in the industrial workplace. Shortly thereafter, a combustible dust bill passed in the House but stalled in the Senate.

The CSB Dust Hazard Study provided the public and stakeholders an excellent summary of fire and explosion hazards that combustible dust poses in the workplace. Yet the incident data concerning probability of occurrence was grossly underreported with mention of only 281 incidents in a twenty five year period in addition to stating that fatalities and injuries occur in 70% of incidents, which is not true.

With the appearance that fatalities and injuries were a regular occurrence in combustible dust incidents, Congress was forced to act. Now with the new administration, OSHA is in the rulemaking process, developing a general industry combustible dust standard. So what's next, a flammable gas, liquid, vapor, and mist general industry standard for fire and explosion hazards. I don't think so, as that doesn't make much sense and neither does a separate combustible dust standard.

Process Safety Management Solution
Instead, combustible dust needs to be addressed as a hazard to workers that provides a potentially explosive atmosphere, like flammable gases, vapors, and mists. Already, for nearly two decades, the OSHA Process Safety Management system (PSM) addresses potentially explosive atmospheres for flammable gases, vapors, and mists. A majority of PSM elements are incorporated in the NFPA combustible dust standards. So why reinvent the wheel when occupational health and safety policy already addresses propagating explosions in the industrial workplace?

Could it be that governmental policy makers do not understand that a flame front from a vapor cloud explosion and dust explosion have similar behaviors. For instance, GexCon has developed a successful Flame Acceleration Simulation Code (FLACS), which utilizes computational fluid dynamics in analyzing the severity of consequence of vapor cloud explosions. This same computer code was utilized in the CSB accident investigation of the 2005 BP Texas City Refinery vapor cloud explosion.

Propagating Explosions
In addition to FLACS, GexCon has developed a Dust Explosion Simulation Code (DESC), which is derived from FLACS gas explosion simulations. Both codes utilize a burning velocity model determining the velocity of the flame relative to the reactants and a flame model that controls the localization and area of the flame. Vapor cloud and dust explosions are propagating explosions that have similiar characteristics of laminar and turbulent flow in their flame fronts. There is much more fascinating science behind this simple explanation and additional information can be found on the GexCon link

Conclusion
The important point here is that a dust explosion is a propagating explosion like a vapor cloud explosion and a separate OSHA combustible dust standard is unnecessary. Already protective and mitigative measures are in place within the OSHA regulatory framework with PSM. All that is needed now is to develop a hybrid PSM for combustible dust fire and explosion hazards. It is much easier for governmental policy makers to develop a separate OSHA combustible dust standard rather than critically analyzing the dynamics of combustible dust related fires and explosions, which are propagating just like vapor cloud explosions.

This alternative solution of combustible dust included in PSM is easier said than done as the damage has already been done with the preponderance of misinformation that's already been portrayed in the media and governmental press releases that all dust explosions can be prevented, fatality/injuries having a high occurrence in combustible dust incidents, and OSHA is at fault for prior inaction, all which are false.

The union's suggestion in their recent media advisory that the public, workers, and industry stakeholders be allowed to participate in the CSB investigation and recommendation process might just be one solution in getting the house in order so as to reduce the probability and minimize the severity of future accidents in the nation's workplace. Yet the problem runs much deeper than that, with the limited budget that the Chemical Safety Board has to work with. Especially with the heavy workload and understaffing investigating industry accidents with limited resources.

Sunday, September 27, 2009

CSB Recommendations Deficient-Flash Fire Hazards


Shameir Frasier-Imperial Sugar Refinery Burn Survivor

Many stakeholders were anxious to hear the Chemical Safety Board (CSB) key findings and recommendations in the September 24, 2009 release of the final investigation report on the catastrophic dust explosion at Imperial Sugar Refinery. The CSB made five key recommendations with included adherence to NFPA combustible dust standards, comprehensive housekeeping, hazard communication training, emergency response, and that Imperial Sugar implement corrective actions in accordance with best engineering practices referenced in the NFPA standards. These recommendations were not solely directed at Imperial Sugar but the entire industrial sector that handles combustible particulate solids, which generate combustible dust. Yet CSB left out a key recommendation that workers don flame resistant clothing in the protection from flash fire severe burn injuries.

CSB Dust Hazard Study
In 2006 CSB concluded a Dust Hazard Study following a series of catastrophic high consequence dust explosions that occurred in 2003. The important safety recommendations of the study were forwarded to OSHA, which provided the agency a foundation in the formulation of the 2007 and 2008 reissued Combustible Dust National Emphasis Program (NEP). Additionally, following the Imperial Sugar Refinery explosion, the House Education and Labor Committee drafted a combustible dust bill utilizing the CSB Dust Hazard Study recommendations as the framework of the bill. Currently OSHA is drafting a general industry combustible dust regulation, which also is utilizing the CSB Dust Hazard Study recommendations as guidance.

All the recommendations from the Chemical Safety Board prompting action addressing combustible dust hazards in the industrial workplace is great and long overdue yet many layers of protection have been overlooked in the recommendations. This was especially evident when the data from the Dust Hazard Study only recognizes that 281 incidents occurred from 1980-2005, when in reality the incidents are ten times that many. For example, in 2008, the Combustible Dust Policy Institute discovered through media accounts, there were over 150 incidents in the manufacturing, non-manufacturing, and utility sectors. Probability of occurrence is an important element in obtaining an understanding of the complex issue of combustible dust.

For instance, the OSHA Combustible Dust NEP lists several dozen manufacturing national industries (NAICS) that have the potential or have a high risk in experiencing combustible dust incidents. Yet over 50% of national industries that had combustible dust related fires and explosions in 2008 were not listed as target industries (NAICS). Not to be picking on the paper subsector but to use as an example to illustrate a point, it's national industries (NAICS)are absent from the Dust NEP. On a global perspective amongst our international trading partners, an April 2009 dust explosion at a South African paper printing plant resulted in 14 fatalities and dozen of injuries from burns. This incident highlights that paper dust has a high consequence and potential for combustible dust fires and explosions.

Importance of PPE
Understanding probability of occurrence and severity of consequence is only one important aspect in addressing combustible dust hazards in the industrial workplace. Layers of protection are derived from administrative controls and best engineering practices with the final layer, personnel protection equipment (PPE). The Chemical Safety Board overlooked PPE in the recommendations following the key findings of the Imperial Sugar Refinery dust explosion. For instance the April 23, 2008 Chatham Emergency Management Agency, After Action Report mentions that 36 persons were injured and transported to Memorial hospital in Savannah, Ga; 14 of those were non life-threatening injuries. Eventually a total of 20 victims were relocated to the Joseph M. Still Burn Center at Doctors Hospital in Augusta, Georgia with life threatening burn injuries.

Doctors Hospital: Joseph M. Still Burn Center from Doctors Hospital on Vimeo.


Traumatic Burn Injuries
In a Burn Care Commentary time-line of the events following the dust explosion, the Joseph M. Still Burn Center highlights that the victims had," thermal burn injuries ranging from 5% Total Body Surface Area (TBSA) damage, treatable onsite and in area Emergency Departments, to 95% TBSA— critical burn damage that in most cases is not survivable." The Combustible Dust Policy Institute believes that if the workers had worn personnel protection equipment in the donning of flame resistant clothing (FRC), the Total Body Surface Area (TBSA) damage would of been less severe. Without FRC once a fireball makes contact with conventional clothing, the clothing ignites causing even more severe burns than the original flame.

A news account of a worker that succumbed to his burns at the Joseph M. Still Burn Center a week following the dust explosion indicated he had third degree burns on more than 80% of his body. Of the 20 workers that were admitted to the burn center, six (30%) did not survive due to the severity of their burn injuries. Malcolm Frazier, 47, of Savannah, a floor manager at the plant, with burns covering 85 percent of his body was the last one to succumb on August 22, 2008. Malcolm fought a brave fight hanging on for over seven months while his parents Richard and Hattie Frazier vigilantly stood by, encouraging him to persevere.

Burn Injury Studies
Chances of survival after life threatening burn injuries diminish rapidly in accordance with one's age group. In a 1991-1993 study conducted by the American Burn Association, results indicated Total Body Surface Area (TBSA) damage is a key survival factor for burn victims based on the age of the victim. For instance chances in survival of a victim in the 40-49 age group with over 75% TBSA is 30% versus 60% survivability for the 20-29 age group

Lawrence Manker Jr, 20, in the latter group was the last Imperial Sugar burn patient to be released from the burn center in October 2008. Lawrence, like Malcolm had burns to over 85% of his body. To assist the healing process, doctors medically induced him into a coma for six months so they could treat the severe burns. Studies have shown that burns to over 75% of the body can occur easily from the ignition and continued burning of conventional clothing versus workers that don FRC, which do not continue to burn when exposed to a flame source.

Flame Resistant Clothing in Industry
Workers in industries such as the petroleum, petrochemical, and chemical sectors where flash fire hazards also are present, already are donning flame resistant clothing in adherence with the requirements of proper personnel protection equipment. There is a disconnect in the USA where many governmental agencies, legislative officials, trade associations, professional organizations, and numerous other stakeholders are not aware that a dust explosion is a propagating explosion like a vapor cloud explosion which occurred at the BP Texas City Refinery in 2005. Both explosions have the devastating effects of overpressure, thermal radiation, and ensuing projectiles.

Reviewing the OSHA NEP's for combustible dust and Process Hazard Management (PSM), OSHA management recommends that CHSO's (inspectors) wear flame resistant clothing when conducting inspections at facilities where flash fire hazards are present. Ironically after over 55% of the victims from the Imperial Sugar explosion sustained life threatening burn injuries that were admitted to the Joseph M. Still Burn Center, the Chemical Safety Board does not include a sixth recommendation that flame resistant clothing be worn in potentially combustible dust explosive environments.

Conclusion
The only reason I can think that this recommendation was not included was due to the current litigation with millions of dollars at stake in potential compensation of all the burn victim survivors and families of the deceased. CSB must maintain neutrality and maintain impartiality in not placing blame. Including this important yet vital recommendation would of enhanced the plaintiffs case and been a damaging blow to the defendants. In all fairness, Imperial Sugar Refinery employees are now wearing FRC's in addtion to state of the art best engineering practices that CEO John Sheptor has implemented in the reconstruction efforts since the February 7, 2008 explosion.

An OSHA combustible dust standard is long overdue for general industry. In the past six years there's only been a handful of dedicated career governmental employees and legislators directing this much needed occupational health and safety policy. Last Thursday at the Hilton Savannah Desoto on East Liberty Street was a monumental and historical event where the CSB provided much needed recommendations to Imperial Sugar and the entire industry.

These recommendations will validate OSHA's current combustible dust rulemaking process. But that is where the problem arises, especially when all layers of protections are lacking, but must be considered in preventing future fatalities, severe injuries, and devastating economic damage. Personnel protection equipment in FRC's is just as important as housekeeping, training , emergency response, and NFPA best engineering practices. We owe it to Imperial Sugar Refinery explosion victims, survivors and families to get it right in the combustible dust rulemaking process so as to prevent and minimize future catastrophic occurrences.

UPDATE
9/25/09-OSHA combustible dust regulation submitted to OMB for Review. On the fast track now following CSB Imperial Sugar Recommendations http://ow.ly/rkV8 Thanks Larry, for sharing

Monday, April 7, 2008

Mark-up of H.R. 5522, Combustible Dust Legislation

The House Education and Labor Committee will vote Wednesday, 9 April on the Combustible Dust Explosion and Fire Prevention Act (H.R. 5522). Earlier on 12 March a hearing was held concerning pending legislation in response to the recent Imperial Sugar Refinery explosion in Georgia and OSHA's failure to act on comprehensive a combustible dust standard in general industry as recommended by the Chemical Safety Board.

Since the February 7 Imperial Sugar refinery explosion there has been 29 combustible dust fires and explosions in general industries throughout the United States, which doesn't include grain handling facilities. Facilities which handle grain must comply with the OSHA grain handling combustible dust standard that was implemented in 1988. Prior to the OSHA grain standard there were numerous combustible dust fires and explosions resulting in preventable fatalities and injuries. Over the past two months there has been nine combustible dust fires and explosions at grain facilities, which includes three explosions.

National Fire Protection Association
For nearly a century the National Fire Protection Association has formulated fire codes in the protection of property and personnel. Several of these fire codes deal with metal, food, wood, and agricultural combustible dusts. In contrast, the majority of state fire marshals have not implemented these combustible dust fire codes in their inspection protocol and thats where the main problem is concerning the continual occurrence of preventable and predictable combustible dust fires and explosions.

The Combustible Dust Explosion and Fire Prevention Act (H.R. 5522) will require that the National Fire Protection Association's Standard for the Prevention of Fire and Dust Explosions from the Manufacturing, Processing, and Handling of Combustible Particulate Solids-2006 (NFPA 654) and Standard for Combustible Metals-2006 (NFPA 484) be adhered to by all states whether or not such protection is already incorporated in state fire codes.

National Emphasis Program

OSHA has instituted a voluntary National Emphasis Program for combustible dusts since October 2007 that has not offered the protection in the prevention of future incidents. For example, the program guidelines direct OSHA inspectors to obtain dusts samples for analysis at the OSHA Salt Lake Testing facility in the determination of the ignition sensitivity and explosion severity of dusts generated at a facility. This is a backward approach since thousands of manufacturing plants are already generating combustible dusts in their processes and waiting for a inspector to arrive is a recipe for disaster as can be seen in the Imperial Sugar refinery resulting in 13 fatalities.

Opposing Passage of Bill
Opponents of the Combustible Dust Explosion and Fire Prevention Act (H.R. 5522) feel that a congressional mandate in preventable combustible dust explosions and fires is to rapid of an approach and more input needs to be addressed between regulators, industry, state fire marshals, trade associations, and labor organizations. Additionally, opponents of the pending bill believe that a "one size fits all" covering combustible dusts across a wide spectrum of industries will lead to problems in the interpretation of an OSHA comprehensive combustible dust regulation.

The national consciousness of preventable combustible dust explosions and fires have yet to be aroused in between the presidential primaries and only a small minority of stakeholders vocally desire the passage of a combustible dust bill. With House committee members politically divided between the interests of labor and industry, movement of the bill to the house floor will be an uphill battle for the proponents.

Text of Bill

Thursday, March 6, 2008

Pre-Op Combustible Dust Legislation Hearing


It ought to be quite dicey at the House Education and Labor committee hearing next week covering the Combustible Dust Explosion and Fire Prevention Act of 2008 (H.R. 5522), which was introduced by Reps. George Miller and John Barrow (D-GA). There will definitely be an atmosphere of us against them between the Democrat and Republican committee members who represent conflicting interests of labor and business.

After viewing the web site opensecrets.org and comparing and contrasting the campaign contributors it became apparent as night and day that labor contributions represent the Democrats and business represents the Republicans of the committee. But who's representing the blue collar worker that is not part of any collective bargaining agreement?

The divisiveness is even more apparent between the House Education and Labor Committee when one sees that each party even has it's own web site for this specific committee. One for the Democrats and one for the Republicans . A striking quote on the Republicans website states:

"Under the Bush Administration, OSHA has made significant efforts to supplement traditional enforcement with cooperative partnerships,"

Cooperative partnerships
, that basically means no irksome costly regulations and instead form voluntary industry alliances . This is the same tone that Edwin Foulke, the director of OSHA is touting as a the administration political appointee, which of course would be only natural. If this wasn't his position then he wouldn't have a job anymore and would be back practicing law in the Carolinas.

Most troubling in the preemptive hours before the committee hearing is the dissension across the aisles that partisan committee members have against one another from an event nearly two months ago concerning House passage of the S-Miner Bill H.R. 2768,, which Republicans claim rolls back mine safety reforms.

"...Over the strong objections of leading Republicans, academic experts, and the mining community, the U.S. House of Representatives today narrowly passed legislation that rewrites major mine safety legislation approved less than two years ago. Republicans objected to the S-MINER Act (H.R. 2768) because it halts the progress of bipartisan ..."



For an excellent preview of what to expect at next week's hearing concerning the atmosphere that will prevail. Then check out this video where we can listen to Rep Don Young (R-AK) speak on H.R. 2768, the S-Miner Act and its negative effect on energy. Just strike out Miner Act and add the Combustible Dust Explosion Act when you listen, then you'll be on the right trail.

When one takes an overall view of this impending legislation it would be advantageous to look at the legislative history of the grassroots movement that formed for the house passage of the S-Miner Bill in January 2008. For example, a lobby composed of 325 corporations with 1.6 million dollars of spending money represented by the National Mining Association was amazingly defeated by 95,000 miners represented by the United Miner Workers of America on a $20,000
in lobbying money in the first half of 2007. Hopefully, that sort of momentum will occur with the Combustible Dust Explosion and Fire Prevention Act of 2008 (H.R. 5522) that Congressman Miller and Barrow drafted for impending legislation.

Click on the Google Map for an enlarged view, The fire logos are preventable combustible dust related fires and explosions over the past two months. The red bubbles are representative of electoral districts where current Republican committee members sit on the House Education and Labor Committee. Just figure I'd illustrate how prevalent this issue is and how close it strikes to home with Dixie Crystal not being an isolated incident.

 

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