Chemical Preparations Dryer Fire

Yesterday a spray dryer fire at chemical preparations and toll manufacturing plant for pet food, agricultural, personal care and industrial markets. Example of dryers utilized at the facility.

Spray Drying: Rogers Box Dryer 3,000 lbs./hr. Liquid evaporation rate

Fluid Bed Dryer/Agglomeration 200 lbs. / 400 lbs./hr. Liquid evaporation rate

Rotary Drum Dryer 700 lbs./hr. capacity

An excellent text concerning prevention and mitigation of dryer fires can be found in the Institute of Chemical Engineers text, "Prevention of fires and explosions in Dryers-A User Guide."

Atomized Aluminum Powder Explosion/Fire

An investigation is continuing concerning the fire that occurred on the atomizing line at the Toyal America Lockport, Illinois facility two days ago. News Video, explosion aftermath.

Aluminum Dust Incidents:
Catalina Cylinders 8/21/08-dust-collecting hopper
Commercial Alloys 7/26/08-aluminum grinding machine
DWA Aluminum Composites 4/28/08-explosion

Aluminum Powder Mfg. Process: Nova Bimet Technologies Pvt. Ltd
Working Safely with Aluminum Powder CCOHS
ALUMINIUM POWDER – HAZARDOUS OR NOT? ALPOCO

From: Aluminum powder applications. by Gurganus, Thomas B.
Source: Advanced Materials & Processes, 8/1/1995.
Via: HighBeam™ Research

Coal Dust Fire India Thermal Plant

Third combustible coal dust fire in the past three months in India, at a coal-fired electric generating plant. Maybe a strict housekeeping program would lessen the likelihood of the next fire. NFPA 120 Standard for Coal Preparation Plants, is an excellent resource in preventative and mitigative measures here in the United States.

Additionally, the PRB Coal Users Group works proactively with their membership in sharing "best engineering practices" in the handling of coal at energy plants. Also, Hazard Control Technologies, a supplier of industrial firefighting equipment offers a wide array of products and training that assists firefighters in responding to coal dust fires at power plants.

Dust Collector Fire New Jersey

http://www.packetonline.com/articles/2008/08/29/cranbury_press/news/doc48b815ae1c279401755058.txt

Fire in an exterior cyclone sawdust collector where officials believe that a mechanical problem caused a spark, igniting the sawdust. Would spark detection and extinguishment system lessened the severity and likelihood of this incident? Additionally, a proactive inspection and maintenance program as outlined in NPFA 664 will provide added protection to all manufacturing facilities that process combustible particulate solids.

Wood Pellet Plant Dust Explosion Again

http://www.herald-mail.com/?cmd=displaystory&story_id=201753&format=html

Within six weeks another combustible dust explosion occurred at AJ Stove and Pellets in Marion, PA., which is a wood pellet manufacturing facility. Since there were no fatalities or injuries in the prior hopper explosion on July 15, an OSHA inspection did not ensue.

This is not a question of OSHA inspections after manufacturing facility combustible dust explosions or fires but whether local fire inspectors working closely with the responding fire departments have means to communicate issues of fire safety after a combustible dust related fire or explosion.

It's much easier to draft a combustible dust bill instead of the time consuming effort that is needed to address the root of the problem. Which is local fire inspections utilizing a building permit system to assist in funding fire inspectors for proactive inspections of manufacturing facilities.

OSHA resources are already strained and less than 10% of the nations manufacturing plants are inspected with the unique NAICS in the wood pellet industry. Would local fire marshal inspections lessen the number of incidents while at the same time reduce the severity of combustible dust related fires and explosions? A community in New Zealand offers an excellent alternative to fire safety concerning commercial buildings, utilizing fire inspectors.

In the past six months, over 50% of combustible dust explosions occurring in the manufacturing sector are repeats of prior combustible dust fires and explosions. A majority of these had no record of OSHA inspections prior to or after the event. The prevalence of incidents will continue to reoccur until the root of the problem is addressed and that is cooperation between fire departments and fire inspectors after the initial incident.

Three days prior to the AJ Stove & Pellet explosion, Industrial Roller Company in Smithton, Illinois had a rubber dust explosion in the dust hopper and the fireball exiting the hopper severely burned a worker. From a news report in the Belleville New Democrat, Mike Schutzenhofer, assistant chief of the Smithton Fire Department, stated, “In the last four years or so, we’ve been called there for about six fires involving their dust collection system,” Schutzenhofer said. “This is the first one where there’s been an injury.”

Waiting for an injury is to late for taking action. In a proactive manner, all combustible dust related fires need to be investigated to ensure general consensus industry standards of care located in the NFPA combustible dust standards are adhered too. For example, a fire inspector or fire chief, knowledgeable about NFPA combustible dust standards might of realized earlier at the Industrial Roller location that the dust hopper was in too close proximity to the driveway, street, and rear garage door of the plant.

Instead relocating the process unit in a restricted area, safely away from pedestrian traffic would be the course of action in lessening the severity (mitigating) the explosion, according to the NFPA combustible dust standards. Monday morning armchair quarterbacking after the worker was severely burned is too late now. Hopefully in the future, the root of the combustible dust issue will be addressed with local jurisdictional interaction between all stakeholders. An OSHA comprehensive combustible dust regulation will not provide the workplace protection that is direly needed with the current lack of OSHA resources.

Combustible Dust Materials Causing Incidents

According to media accounts over the last six months since the Imperial Sugar Refinery sugar dust explosion over 80 combustible dust related fires and explosions have occurred in the United States in the nations' manufacturing sector. Many incidents are not reported to the media, so the fires and explosions that are reported are only a small sampling of events in the manufacturing sector.

The Combustible Dust Policy Institute at the research facility in Santa Fe, Texas has discovered that over 30% of the incidents are repeats of combustible dust fires and explosions. Incidents reoccur because the initial fire or explosion is not reported to enforcement and regulatory agencies unless fatalities or numerous injuries result from the incident. As a result, proactive preventive and mitigative measures, which minimize the occurrence and reduce the severity of future incidents are not implemented.

Since February 7, 2008, wood dust is the leading material involved in combustible dust incidents, followed by metal (17%), food (14%), and paper (12%). The Chemical Safety Board Dust Hazard study did not take into account combustible dust fires and explosions caused by paper or textile dust. Additionally, the OSHA Combustible Dust National Emphasis Program (NEP) does not recognize paper as a material involved in industries that may have potential for combustible dust explosions/fires or have more frequent and/or high consequence combustible dust explosions/fires. The current incident rate over the last six months paints a different story, with paper combustible dust the fourth leading material causing fires or explosions.

Utilizing the 2006 CSB Dust Hazard study as the sole indicator of materials that are the cause of incidents can be misleading. For example the CSB listed only 281 incidents for the 1980-2005 period, when the correct amount should be over 3,500 incidents. Since the incidents in the Dust Hazard Study were less than a 10% sampling, all the other metrics such as specific industries and materials involved in incidents are severly skewed and distorted representing a false picture. This could present a problem for stakeholders conducting a process hazard analysis of their facilities, believing that incidents don't occur in their specific industry group when they really do.

On the other side of the coin, since the CSB data is incorrect, industries were reported with a high incident rates when they are not. For example, over the last six months materials involving food products account for 14% of incidents. In contrast, the CSB report states that materials involving food are the leading cause of combustible dust fire and explosions at over 23%. Currently wood (33%) and metal (17%) materials are the leading cause of combustible dust incidents.

The CSB Dust Hazard Study is an excellent resource in understanding how combustible dust fires and explosions occur. Additionally the report highlights key areas that should be addressed in preventing future incidents. Hopefully in the future, a reporting system will develop utilizing Internet technology so all stakeholders can grasp the extent of the problem and take appropiate measures in the prevention and mitigation of future incidents