OSHA Combustible Dust National Emphasis Program (NEP) a Dismal Failure

"Assistant Labor Secretary Jordan Barab says he believes it's too early to assess the effectiveness of the program." Too early to assess? So how many more catastrophes like Hoeganaes must occur before we figure out the Combustible Dust National Emphasis Program (NEP) is a dismal failure?

Since 2008, through researching media accounts of combustible dust related fires and explosions the Combustible Dust Policy Institute has determined that over 50% of incidents are occurring in specific industries (NAICS) not recognized in the OSHA ComDust NEP.

Subsequently, the CSB Hoeganaes Case Study recommendation "Revise the Combustible Dust National Emphasis Program (NEP) to add industry codes for facilities that generate metal dusts(e.g., North American Industrial Classification System, NAICS, code 331111 Iron and Steel Mills, and other applicable codes not currently listed)," is only the tip of the iceberg.

What about the dozens of other industries throughout the entire manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors not recognized in the NEP having a history of combustible dust incidents? Let’s stop fooling around and attempting to segment specific industries while Rome is burning. If you have combustible dust at your facility then it does not matter what you’re NAICS specific industry classification is.

As retired University of Michigan Professor of Aeronautical Engineering Bill Kauffman stated in the article, "It's not rocket science," If you don't believe it then check for yourself in the next news account of a combustible dust related incident where the specific industry (NAICS) is not recognized in the ComDust NEP. If this isn't a failure then I don't know what is.

OSHA Flammable Liquid, Gas, and Vapor Regulation Next?

http://www.localnews8.com/Global/story.asp?S=11442416

"Fire breaks out at oil refinery north of SLC"

Seems like a week doesn't go by that one doesn't hear about another facility exploding or catching on fire due to flammable liquids, gases, or vapors. Since 2003 the Chemical Safety Board has investigated nearly two dozen of these incidents. Now with this recent incident hitting the news wire, CSB will also investigate another refinery fire in Salt Lake City. So is it time now for a separate OSHA Flammable Liquid, Gas, and Vapor Regulation next? After all, a separate OSHA combustible dust regulation is in the works.

Explosive Atmospheres
Potentially explosive concentrations of gas, vapor or mist in the air, also includes concentrations of dust in the air. Amazingly, the explosive effects are all the same with overpressure, thermal radiation, and ensuing projectiles. In fact a vapor cloud explosion is a propagating explosion like a dust explosion, where there is a pressure wave and flame/reaction front in both. The main difference between vapors and combustible dust is a lower ignition sensitivity (MIE) with vapors.

No I guess it wouldn't make sense to have a separate OSHA Flammable Liquid, Gas, and Vapor Regulation. That makes as much sense as having a separate OSHA combustible dust regulation. What needs to be done instead is for all stakeholders to acknowledge that combustible dust is a potentially explosive atmosphere like all the rest. A separate dust regulation only further deviates from the issue that what we got here is one nasty hombre that needs the same respect as all the other explosive atmospheres. Check out elements of the ATEX directive from our global trading partners in the EU to get an idea of how the wheel does not need to be reinvented.

Dust ANPRM -Physical Properties
Acknowledging combustible dust as a potentially explosive atmosphere will go a long way in fixing the broken OSHA HazCom standard. The recent combustible dust ANPRM did not even mention the physical properties aspect that CSB found was deficient in the 140 MSDS's they surveyed in the 2006 Dust Hazard Study. It's like how would the raw product manufacturer of milk have any idea that his product had inherent explosive severity and ignition sensitivity characteristics? Midstream in the life-cycle at the milk powder plant with the spray dryers is an entirely different situation.

We all have heard it, in all the recent press releases over the past 20 months that a separate dust regulation will prevent dust explosions. Well of course if you shut down the entire manufacturing sector you would prevent primary explosions. But its not the primary explosions that resulted in the catastrophic events of Imperial Sugar and the devastating toll of the three dust explosions in 2003. It was the secondary explosions fueled by poor housekeeping. Simply remove the fuel load and you won't have a secondary dust explosion. In contrast, primary dust explosions will never be totally prevented, only the severity and probability reduced with appropiate layers of protection.

Majority Incidents-Fires
Last year there was over 150 combustible dust related fires and explosions in the manufactruing, non-manufacturing, and utility sectors. Not counting Imperial Sugar, the human toll was minimal in comparison to any other industry. Any fatality or injury is one too many. Yet, the severity of injuries would of even been less if the workers had donned flame resistant clothing. Over 80% of the incidents in 2008 were combustible dust related fires not explosions. Most incidents barely get notice in the news because thankfully there's no fatalities or injuries, only minor economic damage to the facility.

All combustible dust related fires and explosions need to be addressed in the realm of occupational health and safety. Already dusts are mentioned in several OSHA general industry regulations. So lets stop fooling around and get the specific wording "combustible dust" in the rest if the OSHA general industry regulations like is done with flammable liquids, gases, and vapors.

Failure to Communicate
It's frustrating to see all the mention of the issue solely on the process materials (dust). What about process conditions and process situations? You can't be identifying, evaluating, and controlling the hazard without recognizing the entire triad. Sort of reminds me of the scene in the 1967 movie, "Cool Hand Luke," when the Captain tells Luke, ""What we've got here is...failure to communicate." In this case of dust, there is a need to communicate the entire risk in the national policy making dialogue.

The issue of combustible dust incidents is a process situation where a majority of facilities have similiar processes that include bulk storage, material transfer, pnuematic conveying, duct systems, pressure relief devices, material feeding devices, belts, drives, conveyors, air material separators, mixers/blenders, dryers, etc. The only difference is the type of process materials (dust) spread out over 400 national industries in the industrial sector. A Hybrid Process Safety Management (PSM) standard for combustible dust is in order. Why keep trying to reinvent the wheel when a majority of PSM elements already are incorporated in the National Fire Protection Association combustible dust standards?

But again why not? Maybe a separate OSHA Flammable Liquid, Gas, and Vapor Regulation and another separate OSHA combustible dust regulation makes more sense. Just my two cents.

Wheres the Beef? Previous Training Grant Materials

With the recent Chemical Safety Board accident investigation recommendations following the Imperial Sugar Refinery explosion, stakeholders in the manufacturing sector are even more pressed in addressing combustible dust hazards in the workplace. One of the five key recommendations was for stakeholders to develop training materials for employees and contractors on the hazards of combustible dust. That is easier said than done. There have been several excellent combustible dust training programs developed through the Susan Harwood Training Grant over the last two years.

The problem is gaining access to this safety training material that the taxpayers have already paid for. In contrast, the training videos on combustible dust that the North American Die Casting Association produced through the Susan Harwood Grant is easily accessible for free on YouTube. So far, haven't been so lucky on the web in viewing the training materials on combustible dust hazards that Georgia Tech Research Institute, Kirkwood Community College, and the Texas Engineering Extension Service developed from over $500, 000 in grant money through the 2008 Susan Harwood Program.

Training is definitely needed on combustible dust hazards in the workplace there is no arguing that. Over $448,000 was awarded to two recipients in 2009 to also develop combustible dust safety training. So how many times do we need to develop combustible dust safety training? Wouldn't once be enough? Seems like the combustible dust safety videos that the North American Die Casting Association has available for free is the direction that combustible dust hazard awareness program should be going. But what the heck if you got an extra couple $100, 000 in the kitty, then let's spread the love. Who said the nation was in the worst recession since the Great Depression?

Turning up stones always seems to get me in trouble, especially when I end up with more questions than answers. Sort of like when the CSB reported in their 2006 Combustible Dust Hazard Study that there was 281 combustible dust incidents from 1980-2005 or on an average 12/annually. Yet in 2008, after over a thousand hours of research I discovered in media reports over 150 ComDust incidents in the manufacturing, non-manufacturing and utility sectors. If only the CSB would have provided the disclaimer in their press releases concerning incident data, then the media, legislators, stakeholders, the public, and OSHA would have had a better idea of the complexity of the combustible dust issue.

CSB Combustible Dust Incident Data Disclaimer

"The combustible dust incidents included here are likely only a small sampling, as no federal or state agency keeps specific statistics on combustible dust incidents, nor does any single data source provide a comprehensive collection of all these incidents. Information about small combustible dust incidents and near-misses is also generally unavailable. For instance, because incidents that cause no fatalities, significant injuries, or major fires may not be recorded in the OSHA and fire incident databases, the true extent of the problem is likely understated. "

In regards to access to training materials that have already been developed through OSHA training grants the picture gets much larger than just combustible dust training which is a very small niche in occupational health and safety. Since 2003 there has been over $60, 000, 000 awarded to over 345 grantees. Yet only 14 or 4% of these training program materials are available on the OSHA web site. So where's the beef? What happened to the other 331 training program educational materials?

In many instances previous training programs over the past seven years for the same subject are being developed over and over again. So how many times does the identical subject need to be redeveloped and where is the oversight? Web based information, Power Point Presentations, on-line training materials, module interactive courses, computerized training videos, web based photo libraries, and macro-media presentation modules are a few examples of training materials that has been developed, yet there is no public access.

Having these excellent educational materials that has already been developed, readily available on the web for the entire workforce would assist in providing the much needed educational resources in reducing workplace fatalities, injuries, and economic disruption. Hopefully OSHA will eventually realize the immense power of the web through social networking utilizing Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Blogs, etc so as to reach the millions of workers who search for content on their iPhones, Blackberries, and personnel computers. Already many Fortune 500 companies use these resources in selling their products and services. So whats wrong with a new paradigm in selling occupational health and safety to the nation's workforce?

Example OSHA Grant Training Resources
Safety and Health Management Systems

Dust Explosions-Not Cleared For Public Release

Its a bit odd and bewildering how data of combustible dust explosions in the Chemical Safety Board, Combustible Dust Hazard Investigation Report that was submitted to OSHA in November 2006 did not include the fatalities and injuries such as the incident that occurred at a Reconstituted Wood Product Manufacturing plant in Mount Jewett, PA back in February 2001. How can appropiate layers of protection be implemented in the workplace if stakeholders do not know the probability and severity of occurrences if full transparency of the complex combustible dust issue is not adhered to?

Incident # 190, which occurred 2/14/2001, is listed in the CSB Dust Incident Data File. But the description is omitted with the statement, "Information not cleared for public release. " How can that be, with the vital information not cleared, when adjacent to the date of the incident is the OSHA Activity Number which provides a description of the above incident and many others labeled "not cleared for public release."?

OSHA has been citing facilities for combustible dust hazards many years prior to the series of catastrophic dust explosions that occurred in 2003. These citations referenced the NFPA Combustible Dust Standards utilizing the General Duty Clause. OSHA through national consensus continues to cite facilities for combustible dust hazards with the power of the General Duty Clause.

Subsequently, OSHA needs to thoroughly review CSB's helpful recommendations in addition to instituting other layers of protection that will provide sufficient preventative and mitigative measures for the workplace in regards to combustible dust hazards. It shouldn't take an Act of Congress with the reissued combustible dust bill to get the ball rolling. Hopefully with the new administration and appointees within OSHA's leadership structure the entire combustible dust issue will be reevaluated in proper context.

The first step must be revising the Combustible Dust NEP so as to reflect the reality of the majority of incidents (over 60%) occuring in national industries (NAICS) not listed in the NEP. OSHA Region 4 has set an excellent example inspecting facilities for dust hazards that are not listed in the Dust NEP. A good rule of thumb would be if a facility has a dust collector on the premises, then there is a potential for a combustible dust related explosion or fire. Think of a dust collector as a hand grenade with the pin pulled and all that is needed next is an ignition source when the lever is released. That just might get everyone's attention with this sort of proactive attitude.

No matter how stringent OSHA enforcement and inspection activities are pursued, combustible dust explosions and fires will continue to occur. Legislators who drafted the current reissued combustible dust bill have all the great intentions in preventing further fatalities and injuries as occurred at Imperial Sugar Refinery last year. But the reality which they must be educated to understand is that dust explosions and fires cannot be totally prevented. Only the probability and severity can be reduced.

A good example is the ethanol plant explosion earlier this month in Hastings, Nebraska with the grain grinder explosion resulting in two injuries. Ethanol plants have the most stringent governmental regulations protecting the worker, public ,and environment with the EPA Risk Management Program (RMP), OSHA Process Safety Management Standard (PSM), in addition to the OSHA Grain Facility Standard. It doesn't get any more stringent than this. The current combustible dust bill as written won't even come close to providing this much of protection. Ironically, with all the layers of protection in this industry, it has the highest rate of explosions and fires over the past twelve months than any of the other 426 national industries (NAICS) in the manufacturing sector.

The current position that legislators and the CSB of possible protective measures is a great start. But should not be the sole solution, especially when other important aspects of the very complex and dynamic combustible dust hazard issue is not also addressed to the full extent. Hopefully insight from continued in-depth research on combustible dust related fires and explosions that the Combustible Dust Policy Institute is conducting will provide additional helpful information on a broad horizon useful to all stakeholders.

State OSHA Plans Absent

After seven months collecting data of over 90+ combustible dust related explosions and fires from media accounts, the questions arises if any trends are developing throughout the nation in the manufacturing sector? The most glaring trend is State OSHA participation of combustible dust inspections and enforcement is minimal.

Explosions are happening in nearly 20% of incidents and repeatable incidents over 30% . The dust collector is involved in over 40% of events, either from a spark traveling downstream through the duct work or ignition originating locally in the air material separator.

General Duty Clause
Reviewing over 4,500 OSHA inspection reports on the IMIS Database that CSHO's have completed in the last twelve months and comparing with all the NAICS in Appendix D-1/D-2 of the OSHA Combustible Dust National Emphasis Program (NEP) Directive, resulted in 24 combustible dust General Duty Clause citations.

None of the GDC combustible dust citations occurred in a locale with a State OSHA Plan. According to the OSHA Combustible Dust NEP, it's strictly voluntary for these states to conduct targeted NAICS inspections and enforcement for combustible dust violations as outlined in the NEP. This presents a huge problem and a distorted picture of actions concerning federal OSHA offices in conjunction with the overall Combustible Dust NEP program.

North Carolina leads the OSHA State Plans in conducting inspections with an emphasis on combustible dust at manufacturing facilities throughout the state. In contrast, CHSO's from Pennsylvania federal OSHA offices lead the nation issuing General Duty Clause citations for combustible dust.

Prior Dust Inspections
Additionally, the media and congressional leaders have absorbed the political spin of an independent governmental investigative agency that submitted recommendations to OSHA in 2006. An emotional knee jerk reaction to the recent Imperial Sugar Refinery dust explosion and prior catastrophic dust explosions in 2003 in conjunction with the CSB recommendations resulted in drafting a combustible dust bill that now awaits a vote in the Senate.

After several congressional hearings on combustible dust, the word out on the street is that OSHA is not doing it's job in enforcement and inspection activities concerning combustible dust. How can this be, especially when Federal OSHA offices have been citing facilities on combustible dust violations for many years prior to the Imperial Sugar Refinery explosion?

Two OSHA's
In contrast, according to media accounts, over 50% of combustible dust explosions in the last seven months have occurred in states with State OSHA Plans, where an organized proactive Combustible Dust NEP is absent. Basically, there are two different and totally separate OSHA's nationwide, which is divided amongst Federal and State offices. Collecting data of recent combustible dust incidents reinforces the fact of two separate OSHA entities.

Collective Cooperation
A comprehensive combustible dust regulation will not solve the problem of preventable combustible dust related explosions and fires. It's only through the combined efforts of State and Federal OSHA offices in conjunction with local fire inspectors where the complex combustible dust issue can be addressed properly.

OSHA does not have the personnel and financial resources to inspect more than 10% of manufacturing facilities in the nation. What about the other 90% ? Cooperation with state and local Authorities Having Jurisdiction (AHJ) is the direction all stakeholders should be championing in developing a proactive comprehensive combustible dust plan. Not a comprehensive combustible dust regulation with the absent financial backing.

Costly Dust Testing
Incident data illustrating State OSHA Plan inactivity does not truly represent the entire situation. For example, additional funding is needed for combustible dust testing in manufacturing facilities, which would enhance State OSHA inspection and enforcement activity. Laboratory testing at the OSHA Salt Lake Technical Center for ignition sensitivity and explosion severity is very expensive, costing thousands of dollars.

Why wasn't this crucial aspect of the combustible dust bill discussed during the several congressional hearings? Who is going to pay ? It all looks good on paper and makes one feel warm and fuzzy but the reality begins to sink in when viewing the data of what actually is occuring.

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State OSHA Plans

General Duty Clause Citations 9/07-9/08
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