Full-day Combustible Dust Hazard Awareness Seminar. May 16, 2013, Northcentral Technical College, Wausau, Wisconsin. Workplace combustible dust related fires and explosions occur with
alarming regularity throughout the global grain, mining, manufacturing
and non-manufacturing sectors. Historically, many of these
non-consequential incidents have escalated into catastrophic events.
Subsequently, this educational seminar will provide stakeholders with
the basic knowledge and skills in minimizing the probability of
occurrence and severity of consequence of future combustible dust
related incidents in addition to maintaining OSHA regulatory compliance.
Wednesday, May 1, 2013
Wisconsin Combustible Dust Hazard Awareness Seminar, May 16
Seminar agenda will include:
• Introduction to OSHA Regulations and NFPA Combustible Dust Standards
• Identifying combustible dust hazards
• Evaluating combustible dust hazards
• Administrative and engineering control measures
• Facility inspection and risk assessment
Labels:
Northcentral Technical College,
Wausau,
Wisconsin
Monday, April 22, 2013
Media Must Cease in Referring West, Texas Facility as a Fertilizer Plant
Don't kid yourself folks, West Fertilizer was not a fertilizer manufacturer either, as the media incorrectly portrays in many instances. The Texas establishment supplied custom blended fertilizer to farmers in the area as a retail establishment in addition to operating a grain handling facility, yet exempt under the OSHA Process Safety Management (PSM) Standard, while handling a Highly Hazardous Chemical (anhydrous ammonia).
The media incorrectly labels the facility as a fertilizer plant. So a bakery that customs mixes flour and sugar is a flour mill or sugar refinery? As a result of this inaccurate information many stakeholders don't believe they have potential fire and explosion hazards in their backyard.
This is a dangerous trend where safety professionals must educate the media on the facts before others incorrectly believe no hazards exist. Unfortunately Texas authorities did not learn from the Magnablend catastrophe especially in regards to Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPC).
NAICS 42451: Grain and Field Bean Merchant Wholesalers, in addition to West Fertilizer covered under EPA RMP handling anhydrous ammonia with OSHA PSM exemption.
Total number of facilities: 82
Number of deregistered facilities: 10
Number of processes that could reach off-site: 82
Total pounds of toxic chemicals in processes: 28,355,310
Total pounds of flammable chemicals in processes: 0
Number of 5-year accidents: 4
Number of deaths from 5-year accidents: 0
Number of injuries from 5-year accidents: 4
Amount of property damage from 5-year accidents: $0
NAICS 424910, Farm Supplies Merchant Wholesalers, additional establishments in USA under EPA RMP handling anhydrous ammonia with OSHA PSM exemption
Total number of facilities: 3,645
Number of deregistered facilities: 601
Number of processes that could reach off-site: 3,738
Total pounds of toxic chemicals in processes: 6,728,564,906
Total pounds of flammable chemicals in processes: 392,870
Number of 5-year accidents: 138
Number of deaths from 5-year accidents: 3
Number of injuries from 5-year accidents: 191
Amount of property damage from 5-year accidents: $209,774
NAICS 493130, Farm Product Warehousing and Storage. in addition to West Fertilizer covered under EPA RMP handling anhydrous ammonia
Total number of facilities: 260
Number of deregistered facilities: 121
Number of processes that could reach off-site: 267
Total pounds of toxic chemicals in processes: 101,485,227
Total pounds of flammable chemicals in processes: 72,000
Number of 5-year accidents: 5
Number of deaths from 5-year accidents: 0
Number of injuries from 5-year accidents: 4
Amount of property damage from 5-year accidents: $0
RMP was last updated on RTK Net with a set of EPA data made on May 30, 2012
TIER II Reporting To SEPC and LEPC's
Tier II in conjunction with LEPC' is a key element where many chemicals are not triggered with thresholds in the EPA/RMP or OSHA/PSM programs. In contrast, TIER II when used as intended by the LEPC's engages the necessary hazard awareness on the other side of the fence-line throughout the community in preventing, planning and preparing for future accidents.
LIST OF LISTS
• EPCRA Section 302 Extremely Hazardous Substances
• CERCLA Hazardous Substances
• EPCRA Section 313 Toxic Chemicals
• CAA 112(r) Regulated Chemicals For Accidental Release Prevention
"This consolidated chemical list includes chemicals subject to reporting requirements under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), also known as Title III of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) and chemicals listed under section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act (CAA).
This consolidated list has been prepared to help firms handling chemicals determine whether they need to submit reports under sections 302 and 313 of EPCRA and determine if releases of chemicals are reportable under CERCLA and section 304 of EPCRA. It will also help firms determine whether they will be subject to accident prevention regulations under CAA section 112(r)"
• EPCRA Section 302 Extremely Hazardous Substances
• CERCLA Hazardous Substances
• EPCRA Section 313 Toxic Chemicals
• CAA 112(r) Regulated Chemicals For Accidental Release Prevention
"This consolidated chemical list includes chemicals subject to reporting requirements under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), also known as Title III of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) and chemicals listed under section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act (CAA).
This consolidated list has been prepared to help firms handling chemicals determine whether they need to submit reports under sections 302 and 313 of EPCRA and determine if releases of chemicals are reportable under CERCLA and section 304 of EPCRA. It will also help firms determine whether they will be subject to accident prevention regulations under CAA section 112(r)"
Wednesday, April 17, 2013
3rd IND EX Safety Congress Nuremberg, Germany April 24-25
Nuremberg Castle
Photo Credit: Vitold Muratov
Industrial explosion protection IND EX Safety Congress in conjunction with POWTECH 2013 International Trade Fair for Mechanical Processing Technologies and Instrumentation.For instance, at POWTECH 2011: 704 exhibitors from 73 countries, 15,498 trade visitors (including TechnoPharm)
Two days of explosion protection session topics which also includes live dust explosions (outdoors) at the Nürnberg Convention Center. IND EX, the German based Association of Experts for
Explosion Safety, organizes this two day extravaganza.
Keynote Speaker: Dr. Bert Reichert -Nürnberg Hospital
for Burn Traumas- "Fatal consequences of insufficient safety concepts - burn
and explosion traumas to the human body."
Sessions chaired by Dr.-Ing.
Johannes Lottermann, Dipl.-Ing. Richard Siwek, and Stefan Penno
Presentation topics include:
- Dust explosion in a Fiber Board Factory
- Protection of Mixers and Blenders against explosions
- Combustion of Biomass - Influence of material specifications on explosion protection measures
- Are we sure that certified safety systems are really safe?
- Trends in norms, guidelines vs. old school approaches from the past
- The design of explosion proof Battery Rooms for solar driven boats and consequences for other applications in the field of renewable energy
- Modeling of Dust Explosions to determine optimum protection when EN standards and codes are not relevant or considered too conservative
- State of the art in explosion isolation
- Of using a belt as well as additional suspenders: Explosion safety repeated unnecessarily
- Explosion safety goes South America - about the ABNT + its standardization efforts in Brazil
- Simplified explosion protection of filters - explosion venting, explosion isolation + improved separation all in one
- CFD simulations of the 20 liter explosion vessel
- Dispersion of two-phase jets from accidental releases in hydraulic pipes
- Hydrogen Hazards
Friday, April 12, 2013
Fact Sheet: 2011 Combustible Dust Related Incidents, NFIRS Analysis
Fact Sheet: 2011 Combustible Dust Related Incidents, NFIRS Analysis from Combustible Dust Policy Institute
Near Misses in Non-medical Domains
A Combustible Dust Policy Institute (CDPI) preliminary
analysis of 2011 National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS) incident data provided
by the National Fire Data Center of the U.S. Fire Administration indicated over
500 combustible dust related incidents in manufacturing facilities where dust
was the item first ignited. Near misses include incidents that did not result
in any harm to personnel, the facility, process, or product. Analysis did not include
the grain sector or coal-fired energy plants.
Additionally, the CDPI analysis does not include many
incidents that were not reported by fire departments to the National Fire
Data Center.
As a result there are many more combustible dust related incidents that cannot
be evaluated in determining whether the incident was a near miss or not.
Special thanks to the nation's Fire Departments, NFIC State Program Managers,
and the National Fire Data Center at the U.S. Fire Administration in
sharing this valuable Information.
Casual Pathways Between Near Misses and Catastrophic Events
Excellent article by Carsten Busch from Norway, highlighting Common Cause Hypothesis (CCH) which also
pertains to near misses and catastrophic combustible dust related
incidents. In the current OSHA ComDust rulemaking process and recently
reintroduced proposed combustible dust bill H.R. 691, incidents
resulting in property/content loss (30% NFIRS analysis) yet no
casualties (approximately 95%) are considered near misses. Yet the
casual pathways (ignition sources, dust management strategies, etc.) for
the consequences of all combustible dust related incidents are all the
same.
The true definition of a "near miss" is an incident not resulting
in any harm to personnel, the facility, process, or product. So why are near misses ignored in accounting for combustible dust
related fire and explosion hazards in protection of the workplace in the OSHA ComDust rulemaking process and recently
reintroduced proposed combustible dust bill H.R. 691?
Report on preliminary findings of a study of incident reporting systems
for near misses in nonmedical domains.
This can also apply to combustible dust related incidents/accidents
where NFIRS data provides a multitude of information in developing
barriers for the prevention of future accidents.
Near Misses in Non-medical Domains
"Consequently, the same patterns of causes of failure and their relations precede both adverse events and near misses." Sounds familiar with ComDust
related incidents at facilities whether it was flash fire, dust
explosion, or layer fire? They all have casual pathways of improperly
managed ignition sources and fuel sources. A written fire prevention plan (FPP) addresses these casual pathways initially at the
organizational level. The next step would be implementation at the
technical and operational level.
"We defined a near miss as any event that could have had adverse consequences but did not and was indistinguishable from fully fledged adverse events in all but outcome." Note: National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS) was not included in the report of near misses in nonmedical domains.
"We defined a near miss as any event that could have had adverse consequences but did not and was indistinguishable from fully fledged adverse events in all but outcome." Note: National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS) was not included in the report of near misses in nonmedical domains.
U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB): Near Misses.
Dust Explosion Hazard Awareness / Imperial Sugar Management and Workers
(Page 54 .pdf) "The CSB concluded that the small events and “near-misses” caused company management, and the managers and workers at both the Port Wentworth, Georgia, and Gramercy, Louisiana, facilities to lose sight of the ongoing and significant hazards posed by accumulated sugar dust in the packing buildings."
CSB Key Findings: Imperial Sugar Refinery
Page 48 .pdf) # 4 "Company management and the managers and workers at both the Port Wentworth, Georgia, and Gramercy, Louisiana, refineries did not recognize the significant hazard posed by sugar dust, despite the continuing history of “near-misses’”
Hoeganaes
(Page 14 ,pdf) "Operators and mechanics reported being involved in multiple flash fires during their employment at the Gallatin facility. At the time of the incidents, many were aware that the iron dust could burn or smolder. However, they were not trained to understand the potentially severe hazard when accumulated dust is dispersed in air. Rarely would operators report the minor flash fires and “near-misses” that periodically occurred."
(page 27 .pdf) CSB Recommendations to Hoeganaes 2011-4-I-TN-R9
"Develop and implement a “near-miss” reporting and investigation policy that includes the following at a minimum:"
• Ensure facility-wide worker participation in reporting all near-miss events and operational disruptions (such as significant iron powder accumulations, smoldering fires, or unsafe conditions or practices) that could result in worker injury.
• Ensure that the near-miss reporting program requires prompt investigations, as appropriate, and that results are promptly circulated throughout the Hoeganaes Corp.
• Establish roles and responsibilities for the management, execution, and resolution of all recommendations from near-miss investigations
• Ensure the near-miss program is operational at all times (e.g. nights, weekends, holiday shifts).
Dust Explosion Hazard Awareness / Imperial Sugar Management and Workers
(Page 54 .pdf) "The CSB concluded that the small events and “near-misses” caused company management, and the managers and workers at both the Port Wentworth, Georgia, and Gramercy, Louisiana, facilities to lose sight of the ongoing and significant hazards posed by accumulated sugar dust in the packing buildings."
CSB Key Findings: Imperial Sugar Refinery
Page 48 .pdf) # 4 "Company management and the managers and workers at both the Port Wentworth, Georgia, and Gramercy, Louisiana, refineries did not recognize the significant hazard posed by sugar dust, despite the continuing history of “near-misses’”
Hoeganaes
(Page 14 ,pdf) "Operators and mechanics reported being involved in multiple flash fires during their employment at the Gallatin facility. At the time of the incidents, many were aware that the iron dust could burn or smolder. However, they were not trained to understand the potentially severe hazard when accumulated dust is dispersed in air. Rarely would operators report the minor flash fires and “near-misses” that periodically occurred."
(page 27 .pdf) CSB Recommendations to Hoeganaes 2011-4-I-TN-R9
"Develop and implement a “near-miss” reporting and investigation policy that includes the following at a minimum:"
• Ensure facility-wide worker participation in reporting all near-miss events and operational disruptions (such as significant iron powder accumulations, smoldering fires, or unsafe conditions or practices) that could result in worker injury.
• Ensure that the near-miss reporting program requires prompt investigations, as appropriate, and that results are promptly circulated throughout the Hoeganaes Corp.
• Establish roles and responsibilities for the management, execution, and resolution of all recommendations from near-miss investigations
• Ensure the near-miss program is operational at all times (e.g. nights, weekends, holiday shifts).
Conclusion
Near misses can no longer be ignored. It's very distressing that OSHA in the combustible dust rulemaking process in conjunction with the legislators in the reintroduction of the proposed combustible dust bill H.R. 691 have chosen to ignore 95% of combustible dust related incidents in manufacturing facilities, which do not result in personnel casualties. Yet these very same incidents, as history illustrates are precursors to catastrophe.
Tuesday, April 2, 2013
Explosion Relief Systems Free AIA Webinar May 1st
“Explosion
Relief Systems for Low Strength Enclosures”
Date : Wednesday
the 1tst of May 2013 @ 11am EST
C/S
Explovent, a division of C/S Construction Specialties, is inviting you to join
a free webinar about “Explosion relief systems for low strength enclosures”!
Introduction:
The
issue of venting violent overpressures is a critical one for owners of
facilities where potentially explosive atmospheres, materials, and processes
exist including combustible dust. Recent statistics indicate that the average
damage due to explosions in industrial establishments is approximately $3.4
million, compared to $210,000 for an
average fire. The possibility of an explosion occurring must be seen as a real
concern considering only three common elements must be in place for an event to
occur: ignition source, a fuel, and confinement. As obvious as it sounds, even fine dust
particles and a spark can create an explosive atmosphere. We might not think of this, but if something
can burn, it can likely explode.
An
explosion vent is designed to be the weakest part of the external structure. As
the explosion vent experiences the pressure rise, it opens quickly allowing the
rapidly expanding heated gases to be released to the outside. By doing so, the
internal walls, floor, and ceiling are spared from the damaging overpressure
experienced during a deflagration.
To
successfully limit damage to the vented area, vent design and the pressure
resistant structure must be in keeping with guideline authority
recommendations. As such, C/S Explovent® explosion relief systems have been
designed in accordance with the NFPA 68 Venting of Deflagrations guideline and
Factory Mutual 1-44 Damage Limiting Construction document. Explovent® has been
tested, approved, and labelled by Factory Mutual and tested and approved by the
Canadian Center for Mineral and Energy Technology
for explosion relief applications.
Participants will learn:
- What explosion relief is
- What industries have a true need for explosion venting products
- Types of explosions & catalysts as they relate to the industry
- Why explosion venting should be specified
- Code drivers & their impact on today's specifiers
- Overview of available explosion venting products
To
register and get more details about this free webinar, just click on the link
and follow the step!
About C/S Construction Specialties: For 60 years, Construction Specialties has been a leader in architectural specialty products, including : Acrovyn® Wall and Door Protection, Pedisystems® Entrance Flooring, Expansion Joint Covers, Cubicle Track and Curtains, Smoke and Explosion Venting Systems, Architectural Grilles, Architectural Louvers and Sun Controls. We have operations throughout the world and can provide C/S Products virtually anywhere. For a complete list of our international locations, visit www.c-sgroup.com.
This presentation
is AIA Accredited
·
·
·
·
Thursday, March 28, 2013
California Lower Rate of Combustible Dust Related Incidents Due to FPP?
California Lower Rate of Combustible Dust Related Incidents Due to FPP? from Combustible Dust Policy Institute
How come California with more manufacturing facilities than any other
state (approx. 40,000 establishments-U.S. Census Bureau-2010) yet has a
lower rate of combustible dust related incidents than any other state?
Could it be that they require fire prevention plans (FPP) for all
facilities whereas other states don't? Shouldn't a state with the
highest number of facilities also have the highest number of incidents?
Quite interesting accidentally connecting the dots between combustible
dust related incidents in a preliminary analysis of 2011 NFIRS data and
fire prevention plans (FPP) 29 CFR 1910.39.It’s back to school for us all after coming across this helpful resource with the University of California Riverside's Fire Prevention Plan (FPP) providing an excellent framework with FPP key elements as required by the California Code of Regulations (CCR) Title 8, Section 3221. The detailed FPP document includes a section on Fire Extinguishers where "all faculty and staff are annually provided the opportunity to receive hands-on training and experience in using portable fire extinguishers."
California is one of the approved State Plan States that went beyond minimum federal OSHA regulatory requirements concerning FPP's (Exemptions. 1910.157(b)(1)) For example, California facilities not requiring the immediate and total evacuation of employees from the workplace upon the sounding of a fire alarm signal are required to have a Fire Prevention Plan (CCR Title 8, Section 3221).
Whereas Federal OSHA states don’t require a Fire Prevention Plan (FPP) in this scenario unless the facility follows under one of these three host standards: Ethylene Oxide, 1910.104, Methylenedianiline, 1910.1050, and 1,3 Butadiene, 1910.105. Additionally FPP required where the written fire safety policy requiring the immediate and total evacuation of employees from the workplace upon the sounding of a fire alarm signal.
With a bit of imagination the University of California Riverside's Fire Prevention Plan (FPP) provides an excellent framework for a voluntary FPP’s which should include controlling ignition and fuel sources in the prevention of combustible dust fires and explosions. The U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) did not make any FPP recommendations in the 2006 Dust Hazard Study. As a result OSHA has not recognized FPP in the 2008 Combustible Dust National Emphasis Program (NEP), 2009 Combustible Dust Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 2011 OSHA Combustible Dust Expert Forum, nor on the OSHA Combustible Dust Hazards webpage. The Democrat Committee Education and the Workforce has acknowledged this error with the reintroduction of the proposed bill, "H.R. 691 Worker Protection Against Combustible Dust Explosions and Fires in the Workplace," where 40% of the requirements in the bill are from content in the OSHA Fire Prevention Plan (FPP) 29 CFR 1910.39.
Fire prevention plans (FPP) are an excellent administrative and procedural control measure in minimizing the probability of occurrence of future combustible dust related incidents by managing and controlling potential ignition and fuel sources. Without FPP's combustible dust related incidents will continue to occur in an unabated manner. The majority of combustible dust related incidents are "near misses" precursors to catastrophe. As a result combustible dust hazards are primarily a fire issue and secondarily a potential explosion problem.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)


What is a Texas Tier Two Report?
"Two types of thresholds that determine whether a hazardous chemical will be included on the Texas Tier Two Report:
#1. There are very low thresholds for any of the listed EPA Extremely Hazardous Substances (500 pounds or the Threshold Planning Quantity in pounds for the specific listed chemical, whichever amount is less).
#2. For all other "generally hazardous chemicals" products which require a Safety Data Sheet (SDS) under the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA's) Hazard Communication Standard], the threshold for reporting is 10,000 pounds."